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In many situations an agent faces the problem of whether he wants to
belong to the minority or to the majority of a collection of other agents, in
a ﬁnancial market for example. He decides according to a set of strategies
he has in mind. If he wants to buy an asset, it is worthwhile for him to be
in the minority of those who are interested in the asset, since then the
price to buy would be low, while if he wants to sell an assets, he wants to
be in the majority of interested agents, since then the price to sell might be
high. The Minority Game focuses on the minority aspect and is a stylized
model of such a mechanism. Fluctuations generated by this decision
process are the main topic to be studied within the framework of Minority
Games. It would be of enormous help to the agent’s decision, if he could
predict the system. Predictability of a complex system is generally only
possible in a statistical sense. An agent only observes a single realization
of price trail. There is evidence that in the Minority Game a single
realization already sufﬁces to predict large future ﬂuctuations. According
to the Minority Game, a ﬁnancial market is inherently critical in that it
typically exhibits a transition between a predictable and an unpredictable
regime. Interestingly, taking variations in trading volume into account,
ﬂuctuations generated by this game are realistic in the sense of stylized
facts, provided that this system is close to this critical point. This suggests
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that according to the Minority Game, a ﬁnancial market has to be re-
garded as a self-organized critical system.
The structure of this book mirrors the variety of perspectives and re-
sults of Minority Games: The ﬁrst part is a highly enlightening and
intuitively written survey about the development of and recent results
about the Minority Game(s), while the second offers a collection of ori-
ginal research papers.
The Minority Game should be regarded as a step toward or even as a
new paradigm in economics. Since its invention by the physicists Damien
Challet and Yi-Cheng Zhang in 1997, it has gained tremendous resonance
even outside the econo-physics community. The Minority Game must be
clearly distinguished from mainstream economic reasoning with respect
to the questions posed, the assumptions made, as well as methods used.
Thereby it should be kept in mind that its fundamentals such as inductive
reasoning and bounded rationality are economic ones, founded by well-
distinguished economists such as B. Arthur (1992) and H. Simon (1981),
respectively. This book does not just provide insights into some model,
but rather provides an enlightening guidance into a whole universe of
‘‘Minority Games’’. This is manifested in the structure of the book itself
which, in the ﬁrst part, leads the reader successively from general, his-
torical and economic notes into increasingly detailed formal setting, and,
in the second half, documents the evolution of this idea by providing a
collection of important papers in this context. The introduction is highly
recommended as a fair and deep overview and discussion with many
valuable remarks.
The axiomatic theory of general equilibrium has dominated economic
reasoning since its publication in 1954 by K. Arrow and G. Debreu, even
though in 1972 works by R. Mantel and H. Sonnenschein and 1974 by G.
Debreu himself showed that this theory has too little structure to have
strong explanatory power. Critical estimation of the underlying assump-
tions serving as axioms of this theory have among others led to the
emergence of psychologically motivated characteristics to model indi-
vidual trading decisions. The Minority Game takes a radically different
viewpoint. This is not only due to the fact that the Minority Game was
invented and analyzed ﬁrst by physicists whose focus often differs from
economic ones. In contrast to main stream economics, where agents are
supposed to reason deductively and be completely rational, agents in the
Minority Game are inductively reasoning and bounded rational with only
reduced information. The Minority Game focuses on statistical charac-
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teristics of highly speculative ﬁnancial markets instead of purely funda-
mental markets.
Bounded rationality and heterogeneity have been shown to produce
behaviour that resembles empirical data well. The problem is that the
corresponding models are uncontrollably complex since the number of
degrees of freedom is large, while the interaction is nonlinear. To avoid this
danger, the deduction of the Minority Game proceeds in a far reaching
series of abstractions and subtile simpliﬁcations to uncover essentials of
ﬁnancial markets. It is a special case (symmetric and binary) of the El Farol
Bar Game invented by B. Arthur in 1997, but differs from it with respect to
its objective. While the original El Farol Bar considers an inductive
thinking path to equilibrium, the Minority Game is concerned with
understanding the origin of ﬂuctuations around this equilibrium. The focus
on ﬂuctuations corresponds to the viewpoint that the collective behavior of
ﬁnancial markets is a result of how ﬂuctuations propagate through inter-
actions from the micro to the macro scale. Furthermore this focus agrees
with the existence of ‘‘universal’’ statistical properties, so-called stylized
facts observed on different markets, that are largely independent of par-
ticular details of market constituents and hence provide representative
information about the dynamics of the system irrespective of details con-
cerning micro market structure or individual trading decision processes.
The Minority ‘‘Game’’ is not a game in the game theoretic sense. The
idea that interactions are due to ‘‘agents act against agents’’ is at the core
of mainstream economics. Consequently, Game Theory has become an
important mathematical and conceptual tool. Game theory provides
workable models for small numbers of agents, who are interacting with
each other in pair-wise manner. In real world ﬁnancial markets, the
number of agents is large. Therefore, the value of game theory appears to
be limited in the presence of a large number of players. Tools of statistical
physics become applicable in the limit of huge sets of agents and are thus
well suited to this situation.
Similar to traders ‘‘trading’’ against the market, the perspective of the
Minority Game is that agents ‘‘play’’ against the crowd, not against
individual agents. This approach has a clear foundation in the seminal
works by Erdos and Renyi who invented the ‘‘probabilistic method’’ to
solve large combinatorial problems. The existence of so-called ‘‘typical
properties’’, i.e., properties that each possible realization of a random
system possesses with probability 1, is of essential importance. Typical
properties become more sharply visible if the system size grows to
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inﬁnity. Thus, the larger the system is the more ‘‘regular’’ it becomes in
the sense that ﬂuctuations become small. This self-averaging property is
at the very bottom of the treatment of complexity in the Minority Game
to characterize collective behavior. It also provides a logical justiﬁcation
for the Minority Game setting, where in contrast to the game theoretic
‘‘player vs. player’’ setting, each agent ‘‘plays’’ against the crowd as a
trader trades ‘‘against’’ the market.
Does the Minority Game represent a ﬁnancial market? The authors do
not claim this. In fact, the Minority Game only covers particular features
of real markets, as real markets in general have both a minority and a
majority aspect. This is not a weakness, it rather corresponds to the
modelling philosophy of successively enlarging an initially elementary
model after having understood it in great depth. The elementary setting of
the Minority Game allows for far reaching generalizations such that
corresponding model class is not restricted to only a particular aspect.
This book is about a new way of reasoning and proves the value of an
open-minded communication between such different cultures like eco-
nomics and physics. While cooperation and mutual acceptance might be
sometimes difﬁcult on the ‘‘public’’ level, as the authors themselves say:
‘‘… in private venues, … the communication between economists and
physicists is excellent and stimulating.’’
I highly recommended this book to all researchers in the ﬁled of
economics and physics. Its style makes it valuable not only for researcher
from these areas. Its argumentation can serve as an example for a suc-
cessful encounter of cultures. The value of the Minority Game is to offer a
clear framework in which deep statements can be drawn rigorously, while
allowing for far reaching extension. Therefore, the practical relevance is
concerned with the increase of understanding.
Concerning the very title of this book ‘‘The Minority Games’’, the
author hopes that, with his opinion on the Minority Game, he is not in the
minority rather than in the majority.
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